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Abstract. Belief that images have become the critical ‘weapon’ in contemporary warfare has
enjoyed great currency in the past decade. This belief rests upon certain understandings
about the impact visual footage of terrorist attacks or still images of the abuse of prisoners
have had on public opinion in diﬀerent parts of the world. These understandings, in turn,
reflect simplistic models of representation and mediation in which citizens are assumed to
know little of the ‘true’ situation of war but are easily and primarily shocked by unexpected
graphic images. To explore these relationships, this article presents analysis of original
research from a three-year study of military practitioners, media coverage of security events,
and collaborative audience ethnography across towns and cities in the UK. While military
practitioners feel frustration that communicating with publics is ‘like talking to a brick wall’,
analysis of audience interpretations of Abu Ghraib and other events suggests varied and
negotiated understandings in which audiences account for processes of mediation as well as
reflect on the event being represented. Images cannot necessarily be considered primary to
explaining how an individual interprets a news story, and, to the extent and manner in
which images do matter, this often depends on what longer historical narratives such images
are situated within – by media or audiences themselves. No image is intrinsically shocking.
For policymakers concerned with public diplomacy, for journalists and for audiences
themselves there is a need for further research into the role images – Weber’s ‘visual
language’ – play amid today’s conditions of diﬀused war.
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My brother Mujahideen in the path of God! What can I say to you? I say to you: our
wombs have been filled with the children of fornication by those sons of apes and pigs who
raped us. Or I could tell you that they have defaced our bodies, spit in our faces, and tore
up the little copies of the Qur’an that hung around our necks?. . .By God, we have not
passed one night since we have been in prison without one of the apes and pigs jumping
down upon us to rip our bodies apart with his overweening lust. And we are the ones who
had guarded our virginity out of fear of God. Fear God! Kill us along with them! Destroy
us along with them! Don’t leave us here to let them get pleasure from raping us! It will be
an act to ennoble the Throne of Almighty God. Fear God regarding us! Leave their tanks
and aircraft outside. Come at us here in the prison of Abu Ghurayb. I am your sister in
God (Fatimah). They raped me on one day more than nine times. Can you comprehend?
Imagine one of your sisters being raped. Why can’t you all imagine it, as I am your sister.
With me are 13 girls, all unmarried. All have been raped before the eyes and ears of
everyone. They won’t let us pray. They took our clothes and won’t let us get dressed. As I
* Thanks to the journal’s anonymous referees for comments on this essay and to Andrew Hoskins and
James Gow for discussion about its themes.
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write this letter one of the girls has committed suicide. She was savagely raped. A soldier
hit her on her chest and thigh after raping her. He subjected her to unbelievable torture.
She beat her head against the wall of the cell until she died, for she couldn’t take any more,
even though suicide is forbidden in Islam. But I excuse that girl. I have hope that God will
forgive her, because He is the Most Merciful of all. Brothers, I tell you again, fear God!
Kill us with them so that we might be at peace. Help! Help! Help!
In December 2004 several jihadist websites reported that a letter from ‘Fatima’, a
prisoner in Abu Ghraib, had sparked an insurgency attack on the prison1. Said to
have been written in her own blood and smuggled out of the prison, what became
known as Fatima’s letter tells of the repeated rape suﬀered by its author, alongside
13 other girls. The US State Department continues to deny the validity of the
letter,2 but the US military’s own oﬃcial investigation of the Abu Ghraib scandal,
the Taguba Report,3 admits to multiple abuses including rape. Rape at Abu Ghraib
has been documented by others,4 and evidence withheld from the public has been
presented to members of the US Congress.5
For something as viscerally material as a letter – written in blood – to both
spark vigorous debate among online communities and trigger an attack by
insurgents on a Coalition-run prison compound, seems a throwback in today’s
global ‘media ecology’.6 ‘Fatima’ calls on readers to imagine, and provides no
photographs or video stills.7 Regardless of the authenticity of the letter (and its
rhetorical sophistication may raise suspicions), this communication raises several
questions. Under what conditions are such messages disseminated and trusted?
Why are some messages trusted and not others? But the key issue for this article
is: how could a letter have eﬀects when surely it is images that have most impact
on audiences?
The belief that images have become the critical ‘weapon’ in contemporary
warfare is beginning to enjoy great currency. While security policymakers have
long sought to control public perceptions of warfare through media management
techniques, anxieties have increased due to the emergence of a new media ecology
characterised by the instant dissemination of media content produced and
consumed by citizens, insurgents and terrorists as well as news organisations. This
1 Akil N. Awan, ‘Virtual Jihadist media: Function, legitimacy, and radicalising eﬃcacy’, European
Journal of Cultural Studies, 10:3 (2007), pp. 389–408; Indymedia, ‘Fatima’s letter and the subsequent
assault on Abu Ghraib’ (4 December 2004), {http://www.indymedia.org/en/2004/12/866081.shtml}.
2 After it was originally posted on Free Arab Voice (First posted on: {http://www.freearabvoice.org/
Iraq/Report/report148.htm} – now unavailable) it was allegedly translated from Arabic into English by
Mohammad Abu Nasr. The credibility of Nasr was doubted by the US State Dept (USINFO, 2005).
3 Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba, The ‘Taguba Report’ On Treatment Of Abu Ghraib Prisoners In Iraq,
Article 15–6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade, (2004), {http://news.findlaw.com/
hdocs/docs/iraq/tagubarpt.html}.
4 BBC News, ‘Details of US ‘abuse’ memos’ (21 December 2004), {http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/
americas/4114455.stm}; Mark Danner, Torture and Truth: America, Abu Ghraib, and the War on
Terror (New York: New York Review of Books, 2004); George R. Fay and Anthony R. Jones,
Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison/Detention Facility and 205th Military Brigade, Department of
Defense (2004), {http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/ar15–6/AR15–6.pdf}.
5 Charles Babbington, ‘Lawmakers Are Stunned By New Images of Abuse’, Washington Post (13 May
2004), pA01, {http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A22464–2004May12.html}.
6 Simon Cottle, Mediatized Conflict: Developments in Media and Conflict Studies (Maidenhead: Open
University Press, 2006), pp. 51–2.
7 Though the letter did inspire others to produce images representing ‘Fatima’, for example, ‘Fatima:
The virgin of Abu Ghraib’, at: {http://analogizing.blogspot.com/2005/07/fatima-virgin-of-abu-ghraib.
html}.
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increases policymakers’ anxieties about ‘stray’,8 ‘oﬀ-message’ images ‘escaping’
from the field of war; what Tumber and Webster call ‘seepage’.9 Indeed, the
geographically-dispersed ‘War on Terror’ creates a condition of ‘diﬀused war’ in
which there may be no identifiable ‘field’ to control.10 Controversy has surrounded
high profile stories in which the image features heavily: Abu Ghraib and other
incidents of military abuse of prisoners and civilians, the Danish cartoon dispute,
and every attempt by terrorists to use media to communicate to target populations,
such as videos of hostages, sniper attacks (the mysterious ‘Juba’ for instance)11 or
visually spectacular terror attacks. Bauman writes, ‘“Seeing is believing” means
that “I’ll believe it when I see it”, but it also means that “what I see, I’ll believe”’.12
Writing on war and media in this context, Michalski and Gow argue, ‘The thing
that is going to cut through everything else is going to be the one that has an
instant impact on the retinal – the retinal flash’.13 An image ‘cuts through’ a
person’s preconceived beliefs about an event, forcing them to reconsider. To
manage the possibility of images challenging legitimacy for Western militaries’
actions, for instance the emergence of images of military abuse of civilians,
Michalski and Gow suggest these militaries must engage more eﬀectively and
creatively in ‘image environment domination, containment and suppression’.14
Such practices may be challenging for several reasons, not least because Western
military restrictions on journalist activity are problematic; the exclusion of
reporters from Najaf, Iraq in 2004, appeared to contradict liberal democratic
principles, for instance.15 Conversely, an image could be ‘placed’ in media,
strategically using images as ‘weapons’ to achieve particular eﬀects in terms of
disrupting enemies’ narratives.16 Yet this too is problematic: already-sceptical news
audiences and publics around the world are alive to the politics of (mis)represen-
tation, propaganda and recent ‘public diplomacy’ eﬀorts by the US, UK and
others.17 Ultimately, scrutiny is needed of the assumptions about processes of
mediation that underlie these debates.
8 Marie Gillespie, Shifting Securities: News Cultures Before and Beyond the Iraq Crisis 2003: Full
Research Report, ESRC End of Award Report, RES-223-25-0063 (Swindon: ESRC, 2007).
9 Howard Tumber and Frank Webster, Journalists Under Fire: Information War and Journalistic
Practices (London: Sage, 2006), p. 21.
10 Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, War and Media: The Emergence of Diﬀused War (Cambridge:
Polity, 2010).
11 ‘Juba’ is a presence posting videos on jihadist websites of assassination-style killings ‘he’ claims to
have carried out, but who may be many people. See Audrey K. Cronin, ‘Cyber-Mobilization: The
New Levéen Masse’, Parameters (Summer 2006), pp. 77–87; David Wright, ‘Baghdad Sniper: Myth
or Menace?’, ABC News (10 February 2006), {http://www.abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=1604797}.
12 Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Fear (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), p. 19.
13 Milena Michalski and James Gow, War, Image, Legitimacy: Viewing Contemporary Conflict
(London: Routledge, 2007), p. 5.
14 Ibid., pp. 205–18. Such an approach is deemed impossible by Brian McNair, who celebrates the
unpredictability of meanings a story can generate. For McNair this ‘chaos’ is a democratic force,
disrupting authorities’ capacity to control communication. See Brian McNair, Cultural Chaos:
Journalism, News and Power in a Globalised World (London: Routledge, 2006).
15 Tumber and Webster, Journalists Under Fire.
16 Marvin Kalb and Carol Saivetz, ‘The Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006: The Media as a Weapon in
Asymmetrical Conflict’, Press/Politics, 12:3 (2007), pp. 43–66; Angus Taverner, ‘Dimensions of
Perception: Shaping the British Approach to Information Strategy During Military Operations’, in
Sarah Maltby and Richard Keeble (eds), Communicating War: Memory, Media and Military (Bury
St. Edmonds: Arima, 2007).
17 Helena K. Finn, ‘The Case for Cultural Diplomacy’, Foreign Aﬀairs, 82:6 (2003), pp. 15–20; David
Hoﬀman, ‘Beyond Public Diplomacy’, Foreign Aﬀairs, 81:2 (2002), pp. 83–95; Karen P. Hughes,
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This article seeks therefore to complicate the notion of ‘images as weapons’ in
two ways. First, images cannot necessarily be considered as primary. Many news
stories that have recently generated great public debate or even outrage have not
included a photographic or other visual representation of the controversial
phenomenon in question. The very notion that US interrogators had flushed copies
of the Koran down toilets at Guantanamo Bay in May 2005 was suﬃcient to spark
riots and killings in Afghanistan.18 No images were necessary. This leads to the
second argument of the article. Those seeking to manage and control media
content related to war must take into account that it is not the immediate impact
of media content that shocks, but what that content represents. The data this article
draws upon suggests that news content generates the most intense responses when
audiences feel a story signifies something more profound. Another brief example:
it was not audiences’ squeamishness at witnessing images of US soldiers being
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu in 1993 that mattered, but that
audiences might feel these images signified unnecessary deaths, mistaken foreign
policy or incompetent leadership. The images forced some audience members to
reconsider their understanding of the intervention and, henceforth, the level of
casualties they would tolerate.19 Hence, predicting the ‘impact’ of media content
requires attention to the more complex relation between specific images and the
underlying beliefs, narratives and ideologies held to by particular audiences.
This point has recently been made in the pages of this journal by Cynthia
Weber20, who points to the need for scholars of international politics to account
for what she calls its ‘visual language’. The conceptual challenge this poses is
suggested by the visual culture scholar W. J. T. Mitchell in an essay, ‘There Are
No Visual Media’.21 He argues that all media are mixed: for a painting to have any
meaning, its visuality must be read via ‘critical discourse[s]’, otherwise it is ‘nothing
but wallpaper’, in Jackson Pollock’s words. Any interpretation entails drawing on
language. He adds that the interpretation of (visual) media is ‘embedded in
practice, experience, tradition and technical inventions’, such that the way
viewers-cum-audiences make sense of images depends on what they happen to be
doing, their prior cultural, religious, social and other beliefs and knowledges, and
the significance of the technical medium itself (television, the Internet, a magazine,
and so on).
These arguments are demonstrated in the following way. The first section of the
article explores why images of suﬀering do not automatically create sympathy for
victims. Military and government policymakers’ fears that graphic images will turn
publics against war are simplistic. It matters who the casualties are, and overlooks
audiences’ awareness of how such images become public, for many audiences
‘‘‘Waging Peace’’: A New Paradigm for Public Diplomacy’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 18:2 (2007),
pp. 18–36; Liam Kennedy, ‘Remembering September 11: photography as cultural diplomacy’,
International Aﬀairs, 79:2 (2003), pp. 315–26; Rhiannon Vickers, ‘The New Public Diplomacy in
Britain and Canada’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 6:2 (2004), pp. 182–94.
18 BBC News, ‘Nine killed as Afghans rage at US’ (13 May 2005), {http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_
asia/4544833.stm}; Philip Seib, The Al Jazeera Aﬀect: How the New Global Media are Reshaping
World Politics (Washington, DC.: Potomac Books, 2009), p. 52.
19 Richard C. Eichenberg, ‘Victory has Many Friends: US Public Opinion and the Use of Military
Force, 1981–2005’, International Security, 30:1 (2005), pp. 7–45.
20 Cynthia Weber, ‘Popular visual language as global communication: the remediation of United
Airlines Flight 93’, Review of International Studies, 34: S1 (2008), pp. 137–53.
21 W. J. T. Mitchell, ‘There Are No Visual Media’, Journal of Visual Culture, 4:2 (2005), pp. 257–66.
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approach such stories with a questioning stance, exhibiting more media literacy
than policymakers anticipate.22 In the second section it is proposed that it is the
referent or signified that triggers audiences’ objections, not the image per se.
Images of bodies only cause upset if they signify a greater failure.23 The third
section of the article suggests how audiences may be reflexive about the process of
mediation itself rather than the content of images or what is signified, for instance
reflecting on what is appropriate to broadcast rather than the meaning of what is
broadcast. Additionally, audiences may follow certain ‘channels’ of interpretation,
falling into grooves or avenues of denunciation, sentiment or relating to a spectacle
as an aesthetic experience.24 Finally, it is asked in section four under what
conditions could an image ‘cut through’ prior beliefs and narratives and ‘stick’. It
is suggested that personalisation may be a fertile condition for this to happen:
media stories convey a news event through its eﬀects on a particular person, which
audiences can relate to. Drawing on Chouliaraki’s25 study of spectatorship, the
section contains a brief exploration of factors contributing to such connections,
how media can position audiences to encourage connections, and the importance
of the social situation of an individual’s media consumption in determining the
likelihood of images disrupting beliefs and narratives.
To illustrate these arguments, the article draws upon data and analysis from a
recent study, Shifting Securities, which explored how the interaction of news
producers and journalists, news content, and audiences, in the period following the
2003 Iraq war led to a particular security culture in the UK. Through a new model
of multidisciplinary research that integrated audience ethnography, textual analysis
of television and Internet news, and interviews with government, military and
media elites,26 researchers examined the production of frames and discourses of
security and conflict, the diﬀering perceptions of security held by diﬀerent social
groups, and how these frames and perceptions shifted over several years in light of
critical security events. Research findings have so far centred upon multicultural-
ism, ethnicity and security,27 government and military legitimacy,28 the relation
22 Cf. Nick Couldry, Sonia Livingstone and Tim Markham, Media consumption and public engagement:
beyond the presumption of attention (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 5.
23 See for example Martin Shaw, The New Western Way of War: Risk-Transfer War and its Crisis in
Iraq (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), p. 139.
24 Luc Boltanski, (Translated by Graham Burchell), Distant Suﬀering: Morality, Media and Politics
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
25 Lilie Chouliaraki, The Spectatorship of Suﬀering (London: Sage, 2006).
26 Research by the Glasgow University Media Group (GUMG) in the 1980s and 1990s also sought to
analyse audiences, texts and producers, including in the study of war and conflict; see for example
GUMG, War and Peace News (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1985). However, where the
GUMG analysed single issues in short time periods, Shifting Securities was an iterative, flexible
three-year study in which emerging hypotheses and findings from one methodological strand fed into
the others, and hypotheses were tested across a number of events and issues.
27 Marie Gillespie, (Guest editor) ‘After September 11 2001: Television News and Transnational
Audiences’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 32:6 (2006), pp. 923–46; Marie Gillespie, (Guest
editor) ‘Media, Security and Multicultural Citizenship’ Special Issue, European Journal of Cultural
Studies, 10:3 (2007), pp. 275–93; Marie Gillespie, James Gow, Andrew Hoskins, Ben O’Loughlin,
and Ivan Žveržhanovski, ‘Shifting Securities: News Cultures, Multicultural Society and Legitimacy’,
Ethnopolitics, 9:2 (2010), pp. 239–53; Marie Gillespie, James Gow, Andrew Hoskins, Ben
O’Loughlin, and Ivan Žveržhanovski, ‘Shifting Securities: Theory, Practice and Methodology: A
Response to Powers, Croft and Noble’, Ethnopolitics, 9:2 (2010), pp. 269–74.
28 Gillespie, Shifting Securities; Michalski and Gow, War, Image and Legitimacy.
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between media and terror,29 public understandings of security threats,30 and
democracy and insecurity.31 In this article, data is drawn upon from the
multilingual, multiethnic audience ethnography (see appendix) and interviews with
military policymakers to shed light on the processes through which audiences
interpret images of war and conflict, in particular scenes from Abu Ghraib and
Fallujah. 32 The research was facilitated by support at the Royal College for
Defence Studies, the Joint Services Command and Staﬀ College and the BBC. The
focus groups involved journalists, military, oﬃcials, transitional justice prac-
titioners and security specialists – initially in mixed, exploratory groups, then in
discrete groups.33 This data is not representative in a statistical sense, but is used
instead to indicate the interpretive work done by audiences (and policymakers).
Moreover, given the diﬃculty of generating reliable qualitative data regarding
Muslim and ‘racialised’ minorities in the UK since the 2003 Iraq war,34 and the
absence of such data from scholarly debates in international relations,35 it is hoped
the reader will feel the data a valuable basis for discussion.
Audience interpretations of Abu Ghraib photos
In the following quote, Raphael, a 24 year-old Turkish speaking Briton born in
Israel, makes the case for images as powerful, as having eﬀects:
Raphael: I think for Abu Ghraib . . . no other medium other than the image has more
power. Image is the strongest thing for a human being to be captivated by. I think showing
of images is an important factor in news casts. [. . .] Because when you see an image like
this you immediately think the person that did this is in the wrong. Immediately. So when
you see an image you are immediately on the side of those suﬀering, that’s why it’s
important to show the both sides because the image is so powerful.36
This summarises why military authorities might be wary of ‘stray’ images from
warzones. Raphael suggests that viewers will automatically side with those
represented as suﬀering, hence if US or UK military action results in suﬀering,
29 Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, Television and Terror: Conflicting Times and the Crisis of
News Discourse (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009); Hoskins and O’Loughlin, War and Media.
30 Marie Gillespie and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘News Media, Threats and Insecurities: an Ethnographic
Approach’, Cambridge Review of International Studies, 22:4 (2009), pp. 667–85.
31 Giles Moss and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Convincing Claims: Representation and Democracy in Post-9/11
Britain’, Political Studies, 56:3 (2008), pp. 705–24.
32 The Shifting Securities project was funded by the ESRC as part of the New Security Challenges
research programme (Award Ref RES-223-25-0063). Between October 2004 and March 2007
fourteen ethnographers spoke to 239 individuals across the UK, interviewing the same groups and
families on several occasions to trace shifting perceptions of security, legitimacy and identity over
time. The researchers were: Ammar Al Ghabban, Habiba Noor, Awa Hassan Ahmed, Atif Imtiaz,
Akil Awan, Noureddine Miladi, Karen Qureshi, Zahbia Yousuf, David Herbert, Sadaf Rivzi,
Somnath Batabyal, Awa Al Hassan, Olivia Allison and Marie Gillespie. In the same period James
Gow and Ivan Žveržhanovski conducted 19 focus groups and 21 semi-structured interviews with
news editors, journalists, government and military policymakers, and security ‘experts’. Full project
details can be found at: {www.mediatingsecurity.com}.
33 For confidentiality reasons it is not possible to identify their roles in any more detail.
34 Moss and O’Loughlin, ‘Convincing Claims’.
35 Gillespie, Shifting Securities.
36 Shifting Securities, Strand A, Focus Group Z2.1, lines 290–97.
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which is then broadcast, then viewers will side against that US or UK military
action. Robert Fisk, the war correspondent of The Independent, follows this logic
in criticising journalists for not showing suﬃcient death and injury:
I’ve believed for many years now that journalism – in particular television journalism – by
its failure to show the real horror of war, has become a lethal weapon, supporting
governments that want to go to war.37
Fisk appears to assume that audiences would sympathise with those suﬀering ‘the
real horror’ and refuse to support a government whose military interventions bring
that horror about. Yet Sontag38 makes a simple objection: ‘To those who are sure
that right is on one side, oppression and injustice on the other, and that the
fighting must go on, what matters is precisely who is killed and by whom’. Political
loyalties and attachments can colour our interpretation of images of suﬀering. The
pain of others can signify your safety and success.39 This is both a matter of social
groupings and loyalties, and a historical question. In contemporary studies of
media and morality, arguments that audiences systematically feel compassion
towards representations of suﬀering remain hypotheses rather than verifiable facts,
and more complex than many policymakers or journalists40 acknowledge.41
A related fear expressed by military authorities is that news media disseminate
such images knowing this will harm the credibility of military actions and even put
military personnel at risk. Indeed, violent resistance to coalition forces in Iraq
followed the publication of the Abu Ghraib photos. In one focus group with
military practitioners, in which participants were asked to respond to still or
moving footage, one practitioner connected the death of colleagues to fake pictures
published on 1 May 2004 by a British tabloid newspaper, The Mirror, of British
troops abusing Iraqi detainees: ‘Casualties in Iraq were directly attributable to
those false Mirror pictures’.42 Certainly it may be that some Iraqis were moved to
violence by the pictures. However, when asked about Western audiences, the
military practitioners assumed audiences understood stories entirely through the
image, thus missing the context and complexity of the original incident. A gulf in
understanding between civilians and military was assumed:
Images make it simplistic because they oﬀer no context. There is no ‘lesser of two evils’
[that is, no shades of grey] . . . The military are from Mars, civilians are from Venus. They
only have war films to prepare them.43
Another said:
Most people don’t understand. There are significant challenges in explaining things to the
public. An incident can be full of complex uncertainties that couldn’t be seen. It’s like
talking to a brick wall.44
37 Robert Fisk, quoted in ‘Iraq: The Hidden Story’, Dispatches, Channel 4, 29 May 2006.
38 Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003).
39 See Boltanski, Distant Suﬀering, pp. 10–11 on vengeance and the satisfaction some viewing of
suﬀering can elicit.
40 Martin Bell, In Harm’s Way (New York: Penguin, 1996, Revised Edition).
41 Boltanski, Distant Suﬀering; Keith Tester, Compassion, Morality and the Media (Buckingham: Open
University Press, 2001); Chouliaraki, Spectatorship.
42 Shifting Securities, Strand C, Focus Group 11, paragraph 14.
43 Ibid., paragraph 19.
44 Ibid., paragraph 18.
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In fact, audiences may be well aware of such uncertainties. The Shifting Securities
study indicates that audiences are aware of the dynamics of how and why media
come to publish such images and stories, and given this awareness, this surely
should alleviate some of the fears of the military authorities. One interviewer
arranged five focus groups in which audiences were asked to watch news footage
of a recent event, thus replicating the format of the military practitioners.45 In the
following quote three women in their twenties working in London discuss media
treatment of the Abu Ghraib photographs. Gwen is French and works for an arts
charity, Dominique is German and an architect, and Julia, British, is an
administrative assistant. Gwen and Dominique are religious, catholic and protes-
tant respectively:
Interviewer: And do you think it was right for the media to show these pictures?
Gwen: I think they were right to
Dominique: Yeah I think so too, to show about torture and how far people go
nowadays. And to shock people. . .
Gwen: I think especially as America has taken on this role as the beacon of human
rights, spreading the rule of law and being this fair country, a democracy, the American
ideals, so for America to be engaged in torture abroad I think it was right to show it.
Julia: I don’t know actually whether it was right. I think they [the media] were trying to
shock people.
Gwen: Do you not think they got a response though?
Julia: Yeah they did. But that’s not right, that just by shocking people that something
is done about it. It should have been enough that it had happened, that people knew it had
happened. Like why was that on the front page of the paper, why was it showing all these
things? Because we had a need to know, or because it was voyeurism?46
There are a number of tensions in this discussion. Initially, Dominique expresses
approval of the notion of shocking audiences, to demonstrate to them ‘how far
people go nowadays’ practicing torture. Gwen then raises an apparent contradic-
tion that these images somehow encapsulate between America as self-appointed
‘beacon of human rights’ and American practices of torture. Such a contradiction
and its implications of hypocrisy is certainly a familiar component of critiques of
US foreign policy. But Julia interjects, questioning media publication of the images
and the motive of shocking audiences. Gwen justifies that motive in terms of an
apparent media eﬀect: ‘they got a response’; in other words, because media showed
these images the US administration and military were forced to account for what
was represented and hold personnel accountable for the actions represented in the
images. However, Julia argues that it should not take media shock tactics to
generate such a response, and that to treat images in this way leads to the
possibility of voyeurism. Rather than being a ‘brick wall’, then, the women share
and negotiate interpretations of the fact of the mediation of the photos itself and
their expectations of the eﬀects of that mediation.
The three women appeared to agree that publication of the images did have an
eﬀect, insomuch as personnel were held to account. Gwen said, ‘Americans read in
the papers soldiers in Iraq torturing Iraqis, with no images, are they going to
believe it?’ Julia added, ‘if there is no photographic evidence they won’t do
anything about it’. The notion of photography as constituting evidence is worth
45 Shifting Securities, Strand A, Focus Groups Z2.1, Z2.2, Z2.3, Z2.4 and Z2.5.
46 Ibid., Strand A, Focus Group Z2.2, lines 33–45.
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scrutinising. ‘Something becomes real [. . .] by being photographed’, Sontag writes,
since ‘an image produced with a camera is, literally, a trace of something brought
before the lens’.47 In an age of digital photography this is not always so; witness
the sacking by Reuters of journalist Adnan Hajj for doctoring photographs of an
Israeli air strike on Beirut in 2006 using digital editing equipment. In fact the
evidentiary status of photographs is complex. They oﬀer the authenticity of
co-presence, of being there; the objectivity of a transparent copy, or trace, of the
thing photographed; it doesn’t matter who took the photograph, it is still a direct
copy of what is there – hence the mobile phone footage of citizen journalists has
credibility (perhaps more credibility for being slightly amateurish). Yet the
photograph is always taken from a perspective and, if a photograph is of this, then
there must be a that that is missing. Photographs can be understood as having a
function or purpose; they are not detached from political action, as Nicholas
Mirzoeﬀ has documented.48 Later in the focus group the three women identify
some of these problems with photos as evidence. They are still talking about the
Abu Ghraib images:
Julia: I think also things can get a bit twisted. You never really know the whole story
Gwen: That’s the thing with any news
Julia: I know that. But the point is that you can show an image of something and then
everyone suddenly knows everything about it whereas you don’t. You don’t read the story,
you just see the images, and case closed.
Dominique: In this case you don’t need to know the story behind it
Julia: But you do, you need to who’s doing what, you need to know why people are
doing these things. You do need to know the story.49
It appears the women contradict themselves. Earlier, images were deemed necessary
‘evidence’. Now images are insuﬃcient for knowing ‘the whole story’. Dominique
may suggest that for Abu Ghraib ‘you don’t need to know the story behind it’, as
if the pictures speak for themselves. But Julia maintains that this is not the whole
story, ‘you need to know why people are doing these things’. What is at stake here
is the relation between the representation and what is represented. Dominique
seems to accept that a representation is a suﬃcient basis for knowledge of the case
represented, holding to an correspondence between event and its representation, as
if the photo fully describes the event.50 Julia does not trust the very process of
representation. Why should they diﬀer in their responses?
This is a very important point. As we have seen, it is not just that audiences
have diﬀering interpretations of the same images, but that they are aware of a
possible plurality of interpretations, they are aware that theirs is one of several
possible views, and that reflecting on this plurality is part of their interpretation or
diagnosis of the images they are presented with – asking why diﬀerent actors are
47 Sontag, Regarding, pp. 19, 21.
48 Nicholas Mirzoeﬀ, An Introduction to Visual Culture (London: Routledge, 1999); Nicholas Mirzoeﬀ,
Watching Babylon: The Iraq War and Global Visual Culture (London and New York: Routledge,
1999). See also Keith Moxley, ‘Visual Studies and the Iconic Turn’, Journal of Visual Culture, 7:2
(2008), pp. 131–46.
49 Shifting Securities, Strand A, Focus Group Z2.2, lines 91–8.
50 Chouliaraki, Spectatorship, pp. 79–81. Additionally, the role of captions is therefore overlooked here.
Yet whatever the medium through which Dominique viewed the Abu Ghraib photographs, the
photographs would have been accompanied by a caption or voiceover – all media have multimodal
properties.
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attempting to frame the same event in diﬀerent ways. Factors that may explain the
diﬀering responses of Julia and Dominique include media literacy and, again,
political beliefs. For instance, it may be that Dominique is simply ‘anti-American’
and willing to believe the worst, immediately, while Julia has a more ambivalent
stance to the US or the Iraq war.
Hence whether, when, how and why images have particular meanings to
audiences, eliciting sympathy for casualties and antipathy to war, for instance,
depends on a relation between the representation of a story and audiences’ longer
term political beliefs, and, furthermore, how that relation adheres will depend on
certain literacies on the part of audiences. To address the contention that images
can be used as ‘weapons’, we therefore need a fuller account of such processes of
mediation. This is the first point of the article.
Looking past the image
For authorities seeking to restrict the dissemination of images, it is not fear of the
impact of pictures of dead bodies – a visceral shock – but fear of the impact of
what those dead bodies might signify or represent: unnecessary failure, a bad
choice, poor strategy or tactics, a young life wasted, the promise of further deaths,
and so on. The ‘CNN eﬀect’ literature is instructive here. The CNN eﬀect was a
hypothesis emerging in the 1990s testing the proposition that visually compelling
news footage of suﬀering in a distant country will stir Western audiences and
policymakers to act to alleviate the suﬀering, through humanitarian or military
intervention.51 The thesis emerged when blanket coverage by CNN and other
24-hour news services seemed to cause eﬀects on geopolitical events such as the
1989 Tiananmen Square protests, the 1991 Gulf War, and US military interven-
tions in Somalia and the Balkans. The constant, live coverage from anywhere in
the world was considered to constitute a new pressure on foreign policymakers,
intensifying and speeding up the decision-making process. The validity of the thesis
is questionable;52 in many instances in which it appeared media coverage pressured
policymakers into acting, it turned out policymakers were already acting, but
media had chosen not to cover those policies. Shattuck claimed ‘The media got us
51 For an overview of the journalists, scholars and policymakers who advanced the CNN eﬀect thesis
from the early 1990s onwards, see Eytan Gilboa, ‘Global Television News and Foreign Policy:
Debating the CNN Eﬀect’, International Studies Perspectives, 6 (2005), pp. 325–34. The few studies
to demonstrate observable eﬀects of specific types of media coverage on specific types of policy
decision are Piers Robinson, The CNN Eﬀect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention
(London & New York: Routledge, 2002); and Steven Livingston, ‘Clarifying the CNN Eﬀect: An
Examination of Media Eﬀects According to Type of Military Intervention’, Joan Shorenstein Center,
Harvard University, Research Paper R-18 (1997).
52 Nik Gowing, Real-time television coverage of armed conflicts and diplomatic crises: Does it pressure
or distort foreign policy decisions? (Cambridge, MA.: The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press,
Politics and Public Policy, Harvard University, 1994); ‘Global Television News’; Hoskins and
O’Loughlin, Television and Terror, pp. 53–73; Michalski and Gow, War, Image and Legitimacy, pp.
128–9; W. Lance Bennett, Regina G. Lawrence and Steven Livingston, When the Press Fails:
Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007),
pp. 219–20, fn. 31); Derek B. Miller, Media Pressure on Foreign Policy: The Evolving Theoretical
Framework (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2008), pp. 10–7.
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[the US] into Somalia and then got us out’53 because of ‘pictures of starving
people’.54 In fact, the first Bush administration intervened in Somalia in 1992 in
response to civil war, mass starvation, control of strategically important sea lanes
oﬀ the Somali coast,55 and the possibility of a quick victory;56 only later in 1992
when one part of the administration tried to persuade another part that greater
intervention was required, and ultimately over 25,000 troops were committed, did
US media pay attention.57 Following the subsequent Battle of Mogadishu in
October 1993 when 18 US troops were killed and footage broadcast of two being
dragged through the streets, several prominent journalists and policymakers
blamed the US media for getting the US military involved.58 For some, these
images signified the unnecessary deaths of American soldiers insofar as US political
leaders had failed to explain the rationale of the intervention, which appeared to
shift from a humanitarian rationale to peacemaking.59 The fear of ‘another
Mogadishu’ – of a ‘tragedy’ of lives lost without enhancing the national interest –
meant preventing such images (and thereby constraining policy) because of a fear
of what more images would represent. Richard Holbrooke labelled this ‘Vietmalia’
syndrome, mixing Vietnam and Somalia.60 The US public did not necessarily feel
casualty aversion per se; rather, one dimension of the CNN eﬀect appeared to be
that media publication of images signifying another unnecessary or ill-conceived
intervention acted thereafter as a constraint on foreign policy.61
The significance of images of casualties and suﬀering is not intrinsic and given,
but depends on audiences’ interpretation of what they signify. Sontag writes, ‘The
Spanish Civil War in the second half of the 1930s, the Serb and Croat wars against
Bosnia in the mid-1990s, the drastic worsening of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
that began in 2000 – these contests were guaranteed the attention of many cameras
because they were invested with the meaning of larger struggles’.62 The Spanish Civil
War signified a stand against the fascist menace; the Bosnian war signified, for
Sontag, a multicultural underdog nation resisting a dominant regional power; and
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict resonating on numerous historical and political
levels. Other wars have received less attention because they have less resonance
beyond those involved. The point recurs, then: Our society is not averse to death,
or even to unnecessary death. A recent RAND study indicates US citizens have
‘more realistic expectations’ about the likelihood of civilian casualties in war than
53 Bernard C. Cohen, ‘The view from the academy’, in W. Lance Bennett and David Paletz (eds),
Taken by storm: The media, public opinion, and US foreign policy in the Gulf War (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 174.
54 Michael Mandelbaum, ‘The reluctance to intervene’, Foreign Policy, vol. 95, p. 16.
55 Peter Lehr, Violence at Sea: Piracy in the Age of Global Terrorism (London: Routledge, 2006),
pp. 12–3.
56 Timothy M. Karcher, Understanding the ‘Victory Disease’, From the Little Bighorn, To Mogadishu,
to the Future (2003, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staﬀ College, School of
Advanced Military Studies).
57 Livingston, ‘Clarifying the CNN Eﬀect’; Piers Robinson, ‘Operation Restore Hope and the Illusion
of a News Media Driven Intervention’, Political Studies, 49 (2001), pp. 941–56.
58 Gilboa, ‘Global Television News’.
59 Livingston, ‘Clarifying the CNN Eﬀect’.
60 David Halberstam, War in a Time of Peace: Bush, Clinton and the Generals (London: Bloomsbury,
2001), p. 265.
61 On the ‘bodybag eﬀect’ see also Lawrence Freedman, ‘Victims and victors: reflections on the Kosovo
War’, Review of International Studies, 26:3 (2000) pp. 335–58.
62 Sontag, Regarding, pp. 32–3. Emphasis added.
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media and policymakers predict.63 We live with 1,000s of road casualties, and
deaths from drinking and smoking. The aversion appears to be generated by
unnecessary death in conjunction with other factors. Take the intense reaction to
terrorist attacks or to the death of young children. Is this simply disproportionate?
Or do these deaths signify something extra, for instance a society’s loss of control,
the notion that there are people out there with bad intentions – the possibility and
presence of ‘evil’, perhaps.64 When the Challenger space shuttle blew up in 1986
only seven people died yet the event appeared a severe cultural shock, perhaps
because it signified new doubts about technological progress, central to the
self-image of US society.65 Hence policymakers and news managers must always
consider the relation between image and narrative; between a verbal or visual
sound bite and the context of meaning within which it appears for audiences.
In the Shifting Securities research, the presentation of a television news report
that included images of a house/building-clearing operation in Fallujah in which a
US marine shot dead an unarmed and apparently injured Iraqi civilian in a mosque
(filmed by NBC journalist Kevin Sites on 13 November 2004)66 which drew sharp
concern from a focus group of security policymakers. In the report, a marine can
be heard to say that the Iraqi was ‘playing dead’, before firing on him, and
declaring he was ‘dead now’. The policymakers thought the news report lacked
context, for instance not describing the rules of engagement for such incidents, and
they assumed audiences would take a negative view of such Coalition activities in
Iraq.67 Yet when shown to audiences, the report elicited a range of responses, and
none accused the US marine of murder.68 After discussing the footage for 30
minutes or so, Zain, an NGO worker in London, said: ‘But for me the underlying
issue is accountability [. . .] without accountability this sort of thing will keep on
happening’. Apart from the spatial metaphor (underlying, that is, hidden, latent,
submerged, but foundational), the meaning of the moving images, for Zain, is not
just about what is seen, but what they signify: to him, a larger problem of US
soldiers’ mistreatment of Iraqi civilians without any unaccountability.
Luke, a 22 year old student and Muslim convert living in Edinburgh, was asked
about media coverage of the capture of Saddam Hussein by US forces in May
2005. Photographs appeared in international media of Hussein being examined by
medical oﬃcers. The interviewer asked Luke about a particular photo of ‘Saddam
in his underpants’ published in The Sun newspaper:69
Luke: Well it’s blatantly controversial (laugh) I mean it’s to grab people’s attention eh eh
it’s just controversial, it’s just. Maybe – is it controversial – I don’t know. It’s confusing.
Interviewer: Do you think those kind of pictures would have a diﬀerent aﬀect on other
people?
63 Eric V. Larson and Bogdan Savych, Misfortunes of War: Press and Public Reactions to Civilian
Deaths in Wartime (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND Corporation, 2007).
64 Roger Silverstone, Media and Morality (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), pp. 56–79.
65 Bill Durodie, ‘Fear and Terror in a Post-Political Age’, Government and Opposition, 42:3 (2007), pp.
427–50.
66 MSNBC.com ‘US probes shooting at Fallujah mosque’ (16 November 2004), {http://www.msnbc.
msn.com/id/6496898/}.
67 Shifting Securities, Strand C, Focus Group 11, para. 19.
68 Marie Gillespie, James Gow, Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Shifting Securities: News
Cultures, Multicultural Society and Legitimacy’, Ethnopolitics (2009).
69 On 20 May 2005 the New York Post in the US and The Sun in the UK published photos of Saddam
Hussein in underwear.
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Luke: I don’t think it’s the images. I think it’s the story is more important than the
images. That Saddam Hussein has been captured is more important than the fact that you
see Saddam Hussein getting checked for lice or Saddam Hussein in his underpants. That
he’s been captured by the Americans is more significant. As images yeah I don’t think the
images are that important. It’s the stories that are more important. 70
Luke emphasises that one incident or image is less significant that the broad
political strategy that it forms a part of. The interviewer asks for his response to
a copy of the faked pictures of UK troops abusing Iraqi detainees, mentioned
earlier:
Interviewer: And what did you think when you saw that?
Luke: Em real, real anger I guess. But I mean I think these were fake, these pictures –
were they? ‘Cause – was it not the British Army’s abuse of prisoners – this isn’t Abu
Ghraib is it – oh it’s in near Basra. Yeah it makes me feel angry, those images made me
feel really angry. I can remember feeling that, ‘cause I was in the Middle East at the time
(Interviewer: where were you at the time?) in Egypt and there – Syria sorry Syria . . . and I
remember thinking they’re making a big fuss about it, why are they making a big fuss
about it, but at the same time I felt very angry about the images. But I guess, again it’s just
like a symptom of a much bigger issue I guess that’s kind of making the news
Interviewer: What was it you felt that you didn’t know what they were making such a
big fuss of?
Luke: . . . I guess it was because em it was a symptom of a much bigger problem i.e.
America and British imperialism in the Middle East. Em and just disrespect basically of em
of em Muslims in the Middle East and of Iraqis generally. And again that is a symptom of
western imperialism in the Middle East. I think that’s – in a way the images kinda
reminded me of that.71
The photographs elicited anger in him because for him they signified the broader
political phenomenon of ‘imperialism’ (though it is noticeable that he seemed
unsure whether the photographs were fake or not). Asked whether images lead to
radicalisation, he says it is ‘people’s analysis of the situation basically that will
make people respond more than images I think’. His discounting of images, he
explains, is also due to his own wariness that an image can only show ‘one side’
of a story, and that many images are selected by media simply to attract readers;
newspapers showing images of Saddam in his underpants or Coalition military
abuses are ‘Maybe jumping on a bandwagon’, Luke adds. Yet even he acknowl-
edges some images had a particular eﬀect on him (it is unclear which conflict he
is referring to):
Luke: There’s been one of a picture of a family, a family photo and there was like eh like
some faces that had been circled and they were the ones that had died. And it was an
extended family . . . That’s an image I can really, really remember [. . .] it shows the aﬀect of
the war on like em just normal people – people I can relate to.72
Overall, the interviews with Zain and Luke illustrate how audiences may interpret
images of warfare in terms of what those images might signify, not out of any
response to the image itself. Moreover, Luke’s consumption of news media is
particularly reflexive and he consciously resists being taken in by what he perceives
to be populist news agendas. However, Luke’s admission that a particular image
70 Shifting Securities, Strand A, Focus Group K11, lines 206–17.
71 Ibid., lines 221–41.
72 Ibid., lines 493–7, 559–60.
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stayed in his memory because it featured people he could relate to reminds us that
it is not merely a question of image or larger narrative, but how the two are
composed together.
Reflexivity about mediation
Mitchell argued (above) that interpretation of visual media is ‘embedded in
practice, experience, tradition, and technical inventions’, from which we can infer
that the ‘power’ of an image to have an ‘impact’ on audiences depends on a
particular combination of these contextual factors. The Shifting Securities data
supports this. Analysis here will suggest that not only do underlying narratives
appear to shape audience interpretations, but the very practice of news consump-
tion involves a degree of reflexivity on audiences’ part about the practice itself. As
Stephen Crocker writes, ‘As long as we remain focused on questions of [. . .] the
meaning of messages, we miss our deeply tortuous relation with the fact of
mediation itself’.73
It is certainly the case that certain images came to symbolise broader conflicts
for interviewees during the Shifting Securities study. The Iraqi boy, Ali Abbas,
aged 12 when he lost his arms (and family) in a Coalition missile attack in
Baghdad in 2003, was mentioned several times by interviewees, both because of the
shocking nature of footage of him after the attack, his apparent helplessness and
need of saving, but also because these quasi-religious understandings of his plight
appeared to resonate for participants with a broader political narrative of ‘Iraqi
civilians suﬀering’. In this context, several interviewees recalled images from the
Gaza Strip in September 2000 of the 12 year-old Palestinian Muhammad
al-Durrah, sheltering in the arms of his father as he was shot dead by Israeli
forces.74 Such images become icons, in the sense of ‘a picture directly representing
a prototype’,75 the prototypical suﬀering child. Icons acquire symbolism within a
social context, becoming a stock or standard image,76 and indeed the still image of
al-Durrah is one that has been reproduced over and over again on posters and
postage stamps’.77
However, the significance of such image lies not only in what they represent,
but in how they are mediated. The death of Muhammad al-Durrah was remarked
upon by Zeba, a public sector professional and Sunni Muslim in Edinburgh:
73 Stephen Crocker, ‘Noises and Exceptions: Pure Mediality in Serres and Agamben’, CTheory (28
March 2007), {http://www.ctheory.net/articles.aspx?id=574}.
74 A series of the photographs of the incident are available at: {http://www.guardian.co.uk/galleryguide/
0,6191,377275,00.html}.
75 Thomas F. Heck, Picturing performance: the iconography of the performing arts in concept and
practice (Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press, 1999), p. 34. Iconography is a term and
approach originating in art history. See Erwin Panofsky, Meaning in the Visual Arts (Harmonds-
worth: Penguin, 1970) and Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology (London: Icon, 1972).
76 Andrew Hoskins, Televising War: From Vietnam to Iraq (London and New York: Continuum, 2004),
pp. 106–25.
77 Gal Beckerman, ‘The Unpeaceful Rest of Mohammed Al-Dura’, Columbia Journalism Review (3
October 2007), {http://www.cjr.org/behind_the_news/the_unpeaceful_rest_of_mohamme.php?page=
all}.
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Zeba: There was a thing on TV just a couple of days ago about the Images that Shook the
World it was on ITV. It was on to celebrate the anniversary of ITV, and there was one
image and I can’t get it out of my head. Because they were showing all these big news
scoops that ITV had shown and there was one . . . it was in em Palestine and it was this
man and his wee boy – he was with his 12 year old son and the Israelis – have you seen it
– and the Israelis were shooting and he was trying to protect his son and they both got
shot. And I was actually, I was actually – even to see that in a top ten of – I was thinking
that’s being trivialised. I mean it’s not being trivialised, there was lots of other deaths in
there, but that image was just so upsetting. To think you could actually see somebody dying
on the screen. I mean would they have shown – they wouldn’t have shown that clip if it
had been someone in London being shot. If it had been a ten year old, 12 year old English
boy being shot and his dad protecting him . . . I don’t think it was just being shown ‘cause
it was a Muslim scene, I think if it had happened in Vietnam they would have still shown it
‘cause it’s not seen as being so personal in that way. But that that is the one thing that will
stay with me for a very long time.78
Zeba’s response operates at two levels. She recounts her immediate emotional
reaction, but she also reports her reaction to seeing such images. ‘To think’ that
mainstream television would breach standards of taste and decency she took for
granted is as upsetting as what the image portrayed. In her daily routine she herself
is a ‘sceptical zapper’,79 flicking between terrestrial and satellite television every day
alongside Internet and newspapers. In the quote above we see her media literacy
and reflexivity instantly engaged as she suggests British television would find such
footage of an ‘English boy’ being shot too personal for presumed British audiences,
but equates this ‘Muslim scene’ with hypothetical coverage of the Vietnam War as
suﬃciently distant. Zeba’s sister Haleema also saw the ITV programme and said
‘Okay I can see Al Jazeera or whatever showing it’ [such a graphic scene] or ‘a film
or a movie’, but not mainstream television. This suggests how audiences
contextualise news of war and conflict against diﬀerent genres, so that their
responses to such news – immediately and upon reflection – will be generated
through their comparisons of what is acceptable across genres as well as deriving
meaning from those contexts.
Audiences also interpret still or moving images in one genre (say, news) in the
terms of another genre. The Fallujah footage was shown to another focus group,
in which participants responded most strikingly to the moments in which, at the
moment the US marine shot the Iraqi, the camera footage was replaced by a black
screen but the sound track continued, such that the audience could hear the
gunshot:
Uzma: You hear things but you don’t actually see what is going on. Your imagination
works overtime as to what is going on, what is going to happen
Ismael: In a lot of horror movies, when you actually see the creature, its like pﬀ! [that
is, no big deal] But when you haven’t [seen the creature] your mind is working overtime –
what could it be?80
In the quote above, Ismael refers to horror movies to make sense of his experience
of viewing the Falluja news footage.81 As this exchange suggests, what often seems
most stimulating to audiences is the activation of their imaginations by particular
78 Shifting Securities, Strand A, Focus Group K14, lines 1645–65.
79 Marie Gillespie, Television, Ethnicity and Cultural Change (London: Routledge, 1995).
80 Shifting Securities, Strand A, Focus Group Z2.4, lines 82–5.
81 It is perhaps notable that in 142 interviews in the Shifting Securities study, cinema or miniseries were
mentioned 14 times in this way.
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mixes of present and absent sounds and images. If we think it is a certain type of
story, we will expect it to feature certain things even if we cannot see them. But
what reservoirs of stories, beliefs and information form the imaginative resources
drawn on by audiences in these instances? What comes to mind?82 This process has
been investigated by Luc Boltanski,83 who argues that we engage with news about
distant suﬀering (wars, conflicts, catastrophes) through three emotional reactions
or ‘topics’: denunciation, sentiment, or an aesthetic connection to the event. In other
words we can react with indignation, tender-heartedness, or view the scene purely
as a spectacle. Witnessing a scenario, the spectator’s reaction or topic triggers
particular imaginative resources about that type of scenario; for instance, if I see a
news story about a battle I will expect winners and losers, a beginning and an end.
Depending on my relation to the parties in the battle I may feel indignation (they
are attacking my people) or sentiment (I am glad we won but I pity the casualties
of the losers). With no relation to the parties, I may view it as pure spectacle. For
each reaction, a set of analogous situations enters my imagination: this battle is like
that movie, like that battle ten years ago, like that video game, and so on. Zeba’s
shock (above) that ITV would broadcast the killing of Muhammad al-Durrah in
its top ten Images that Shook the World indicates that instead of denunciation
towards the Israeli soldiers, or sympathy towards the boy and his father, Zeba’s
focus was the aesthetics, in particular the process by which the killing became a
spectacle deemed palatable to UK mainstream television audiences.
We will be able share with others our emotional reaction and the analogous
situations that come to our minds, for in any society there will be typical scenarios
and narratives that are part of a shared repertoire; think how frequently the 9/11
attacks were compared to movies as people interpreted the attack together.84 Hence
Boltanski argues:
By describing diﬀerent ways of transmitting the spectacle [. . .] to another person, of sharing
the emotional experiences it has aroused, and of making perceptible how one is both
aﬀected and concerned, we would like to suggest that the persistence of these ways trace
relatively stable facilitating paths.85
After our initial reaction of denunciation, sentiment or aesthetic connection to a
story and image, it is as if we follow a channel, guiding our interpretation and
response along certain lines. With any of these three ‘topics’, the producer of the
text (photographer, reporter, author, painter) tries to use the text to construct a
relation between the depicted (soldier, casualty) and the spectator, but to achieve
the desired meaning the producer makes assumptions about the topic and
imaginative resources spectators may be familiar and comfortable with. The
producer of the text is always taking a risk. Additionally, audiences reflect not just
on the representation and represented, but on the very process of representation or
82 Readers may also explore the literature on moral panics, which contain explorations of the sources
of apparent underlying social fears. See Stan Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (St. Albans, UK:
Paladin, 1973); Stan Cohen, Folk Devils and Moral Panics (3rd edition) (London: Routledge, 2002);
Stuart Hall, Chas Critcher, Tony Jeﬀerson, John Clarke and Bryan Roberts, Policing the Crisis:
Mugging, the State and Law and Order (London: Macmillan, 1978).
83 Boltanski, Distant Suﬀering.
84 Brigitte Nacos, ‘Terrorism as Breaking News: Attack on America’, Political Science Quarterly, 181:1,
(2003), pp. 23–52.
85 Boltanski, Distant Suﬀering, p. 53.
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mediation – as Zeba said earlier, ‘To think’ that mainstream television would
broadcast the shooting dead of Muhammad al-Durrah was as shocking as the
death itself.
Can images disrupt beliefs and narratives? The role of personalisation
Commonly, the strong feelings evoked by images of war and suﬀering appear, in
the Shifting Securities study at least, to reinforce prior beliefs and understandings.
Many interviewees took a dogmatic stance, either avoiding news that challenged
their understanding of events, or contesting such news, often drawing on other
news sources to critique ‘oﬃcial’ or ‘mainstream’ representations. But can images
ever contribute to a change in an individual’s perceptions of a situation or process?
Can images ‘cut through’ long-held discourses – of Muslim victimisation, of
Western imperialism, of the malign intentions of politicians and militaries? Here we
will look at how personalisation can be constructed in a news media text, and how
such texts can illicit responses from hitherto-sceptical audiences.
In response to Boltanski’s argument about topics, Chouliaraki (2006) has
suggested that indignation and denunciation are a necessarily divisive response to
news, since there must be an enemy to be indignant at, or who caused the suﬀering
we feel sentiment towards. However, empathy can oﬀer ‘universality’ – the
evocation of a potential common humanity. Personalised stories can construct a
relation of empathy by placing the spectator as part of an undefined, common
humanity that witnesses this suﬀering. Chouliaraki86 gives as an example the case
of television coverage of the stoning to death of a mother in Nigeria, Amina
Lawal, in 2002. The story oﬀers greater potential for connection to audiences that
other stories she examines (including floods in India, starving children in
Argentina, and 9/11) for three reasons. First and most superficially, the story is
personalised: it is immediately about one woman, not a group, community or city.
Amina Lawal is shown in a courtroom with her baby, followed by a protest by
Amnesty International and then a violent mob in Nigerian streets. The suﬀerer is
named, she is given agency – unlike flooded Indians or starving Argentineans,
Lawal at least ‘had her baby’ – and even though she does not speak her passivity
invokes a resource in a shared cultural repertoire: ‘woman as silent suﬀerer’. Her
dignity is contrasted with the mob and Shari’a justices, positioned as barbaric
persecutors. Second, audiences are encouraged to connect to the story as a
situation that can be changed. A speaker for Amnesty encourages ‘everyone’ to
sign a petition. This may be a minimal act asked of viewers, but it is presented as
part of a process that could make a diﬀerence. Unlike the stories of floods,
starvation and terrorism, this story asks ‘why?’ This is a story with a historical and
political trajectory, not an isolated instance.
Finally, by inviting ‘everyone’ to sign the petition, the story appeals to an
undefined public. Often, Western publics are addressed by national broadcasters as
national publics; an address by Amnesty International is an address across many
countries (as would an address by, say, Nelson Mandela or the UN). As such, it
invokes ostensibly universal values and appeals to individuals viewers as part of a
86 Chouliaraki, Spectatorship, pp. 137–55.
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universal consciousness. Overall, then, in the Amina Lawal story, viewers are asked
to step outside of their ordinary concerns to share in empathy to an individual, to
share an awareness of a political process whose outcome can be altered, and to be
part of an undefined community rather than one with identifiable ties. Hence, while
it takes more than a simple ‘retinal flash’ to provoke audiences to reconsider their
relation to a story, a mix of images and narrative can be assembled into a news
story that could have such eﬀects.
Personalisation of an event oﬀers one possible means by which a visual news
report can lead an audience member to reconsider their perspective towards that
event. Recall earlier that Luke dismissed the ‘power’ of images and expressed
cynicism towards news media selection of images (‘bandwagoning’). Yet he had cut
out and kept an image himself, a family photograph with the dead circled. The
image ‘stuck with him’. In a discussion about media coverage of the 7/7 London
bombings in 2005, Ella, a Catholic in her fifties living in Edinburgh, expressed
scepticism towards what she described as ‘scare stories’ in the War on Terror
propagated by popular newspapers and television (indeed many interviewees
expressed scepticism towards oﬃcials’ warnings that such an attack was likely).
While she did not dismiss the 7/7 bombings as insignificant, she felt much media
coverage was sensationalised. Indeed, she felt it the case that much coverage was
‘designed to scare’. Her immediate response to the 7/7 bombings was informed by
this expectation of news as misleading or disproportionate, and she exhibited a
distanced relation to the story through much of her interview. However, she
concedes some images may have impacted on her ‘on a deeper level’. Here she talks
of one victim of the bombings:
Ella: There was a girl from Glasgow, she was in her twenties, she’d, er, she was working in
the City [of London] and er she . . . sounded as if she was really nice, the kind of daughter
you’d have been proud of. And I suppose when you’ve got children of your own you know
you sort of. . .
Interviewer: You identify?
Ella: Yes uh huh.87
Hence we see the possibility that personalised stories can induce audiences to
reconsider their view of a policy, process or event. Ella identifies with a fellow Scot,
and as a mother, and it is this that makes her connect to the 7/7 London bombings
as a valid, salient news event rather than dismiss it as sensationalist or ‘scare
stories’. However, personalised stories raise a tension for audiences along a
universal-particular axis. Recall Sontag’s suggestion earlier in this article that our
loyalties are not to all humanity but particular, hence we care more about some
victims than others. It is the particularity of the Glasgow girl’s plight that Ella
connects with, not her status as a human being per se. Is this the only way
audiences connect to mediated, distant but personalised others?
Finally, the Shifting Securities study indicates one more condition necessary for
images to disrupt individuals’ beliefs and narratives. This is the social context of
news consumption. Even when television and other media oﬀer moments for
reflection and reconsideration, it matters who viewers spend these moments with.88
87 Shifting Securities, Strand A, Interview K15, lines 451–6.
88 This is supported by several studies: Ien Ang, Desperately Seeking the Audience (London: Routledge,
1991); Ien Ang, Living Room Wars (London: Routledge, 1996); John Fiske, ‘Moments of Television:
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Discussion with family and friends – ‘news talk’ – may encourage further reflection
or, instead, lead individuals to re-envisage the story through the beliefs and
narratives they already held. An image might ‘cut through’ but be later
re-interpreted depending on whether individuals talk in mixed circles or reinforcing
ones.
Conclusion
If we are to understand the ‘impact’ of media reports of conflict and atrocity, we
must not assume images have primacy or any intrinsic shock value.89 Instead, the
challenge is to understand when, how and why images mesh or jar with narratives,
beliefs and ideologies in the process of mediation between producers and audiences.
This is a challenge for policymakers, journalists and audiences themselves. The
Shifting Securities study suggests policymakers and journalists have little under-
standing of audiences’ media literacies and the processes through which individuals
interpret news, alone and with others. And for audiences, it is a challenge to
deduce what images can be trusted, how images are used by conflict participants,
and how journalists and news producers use images to construct relations between
events and audiences.
This article cautions against the maxim: ‘What the eye doesn’t see, the heart
doesn’t grieve’. Many examples have been given to demonstrate why that maxim
is misleading, including Fatima’s letter, but one more may summarise the
argument. When the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published 12 cartoons in
2005, some of which depicted the Prophet Muhammad, and the cartoons were later
reprinted in news media round the world, the resulting controversy was not only
a reaction to the content of images. Also at issue was the representational practice,
or the process of mediation:90 the right to create such images, the right to publish
them, and the right to condemn them. It was not just that cartoons representing
the Prophet were forbidden in Islam, but that, for some Muslim people, the act of
making such images public represented or signified a Western ‘arrogance’ and
‘insensitivity’, and parallel Muslim ‘victimhood’. Even when images appear the
primary cause of oﬀence, the oﬀence can only be understood in terms of the
relation between the images to longstanding political, religious and historical
narratives, beliefs and ideologies.
We must also consider what audiences find believable. Returning to Fatima’s
letter, it might be suggested that the letter encouraged readers to create a picture
in their minds of a practice they already perceived to be plausible and present in
Iraq – mistreatment and torture of Iraqi civilians by US military. A material image
was unnecessary. A striking non-image in the 2003 Iraq War was WMD (Weapons
Neither the Text Nor the Audience’, in Ellen Seiter, H. Borchers, G. Kreutzner and E-M.
Warth (eds), Remote Control (London: Routledge, 1989); Gillespie, Television, Ethnicity and Cultural
Change; David Morley, Television Audiences and Cultural Studies (London: Routledge, 1992).
89 This is not an original claim but is often overlooked in policy and academic discussion of images
as ‘weapons’. Media studies scholars have long established that the meaning of images is ‘anchored’
in surrounding text or commentary. See for example, Robert Hamilton, ‘Image and Context’, in
Jeﬀrey Walsh and James Aulich (eds), Vietnam Images (London: Macmillan, 1989).
90 Shifting Securities, Strand A, Interview MG2, lines 639–93.
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of Mass Destruction): there were no pictures of WMD because there were none.
Colin Powell’s presentation to the UN on 5 February 2003 of satellite ‘evidence’91
of chemical and biological weapons in Iraq created images of what WMD would
plausibly look like, such that when political leaders continued to speak of WMD
in Iraq audiences could again create a picture in their minds. The widespread
assumption that a story requires images to be sustained on news agendas92 does
not take into account the possibility that audiences can supply their own mental
pictures or imagined images, or remember past images from events that seem
analogous, rendering a story believable even if news organisations do not supply
new images themselves.
Whatever knowledge we have concerning the relation between images and war
through previous work on propaganda and studies of war and media, the context
for understanding that relation grows ever more complex due to transformations
in media technologies and the conditions of globalisation more generally.93 Most
diﬃcult perhaps is identifying and understanding the narratives, beliefs and
ideologies of the seemingly unknowable, diﬀuse audiences.94 From the original
theories of ‘manufacturing consent’ to the most recent media-policy-public
interaction models, the perceptions of audiences are continually reduced to
measures of ‘public opinion’, entirely neglecting the complex processes of represen-
tation and mediation demonstrated by this article95 (one might even speculate that
a relationship exists between these scholars’ assumptions about media ‘impact’ on
audiences and those of policymakers). The Shifting Securities study suggests the
usefulness of integrated study of news producers, texts and audiences, and
interdisciplinary teams are beginning new research in this field.96
91 Colin L. Powell ‘Remarks to the UN Security Council’; (5 February 2003), {http://www.globalsecurity.
org/wmd/library/news/iraq/2003/iraq-030205-powell-un-17300pf.htm}.
92 Deborah Potter, ‘Viewer Beware: Stations Are Re-enacting Scenes, Adding Sounds and Adopting
Other Misleading Practices’, American Journalism Review, 26 (February–March 2004).
93 Examples of studies attempting to understand how war and media are altered by this new context
include: McNair, Cultural Chaos; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, War and Media; and Steven R.
Corman, Angela Trethewey, and H. L. Goodall, Jr. (eds), Weapons of Mass Persuasion: Strategic
Communication to Combat Violent Extremism (New York: Peter Lang, 2008). Useful accounts of
global uncertainty, within which we can discern relations between war and media as but a part,
include Arjun Appadurai, Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger (Durham
and London: Duke University Press, 2006); Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Times: Living in an Age of
Uncertainty (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); and Philip Bobbitt Terror and Consent: The Wars for the
Twenty-First Century (London: Penguin, 2008)
94 Nicholas Abercrombie and Brian Longhurst, Audiences – A Sociological Theory of Performance and
Imagination (London: Sage, 1998).
95 On manufacturing consent, see Edward S. Herman, and Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent:
The political economy of the mass media (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988). On recent models, see
Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston, When the Press Fails; Robinson, The CNN Eﬀect; Robert W.
Entman, Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and US Foreign Policy (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2004).
96 For example the AHRC programme Beyond Text: Sounds, Voices, Images, and Objects; the
AHRC-funded projects Tuning In: Diasporic Contact Zones and the BBC World Service
{http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/diasporas/}, andMediating andCommemorating the 2005London
Bombings; the ESRC-funded project Legitimising the discourses of radicalisation: Political violence in the
new media ecology.
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Appendix
Summary of demographic information:
Total: 239 respondents
Gender Frequency Percentage
Male 100 41.8
Female 139 58.2
Age Frequency Percentage
0–17 44 18.4
18–24 44 18.4
25–34 58 24.3
35–44 38 15.9
45–54 27 11.3
55–64 18 7.5
65+ 10 2.4
Religion Frequency Percentage
Christian 36 15.1
Muslim 166 69.5
Hindu 17 7.1
Jewish 2 0.8
No religion 11 4.6
Unknown 7 2.9
Place of birth if not UK Frequency Percentage
South Asia 57 23.8
East Asia 2 0.8
Middle East1 17 7.1
1 Includes Afghanistan and Turkey.
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